El sistema de selección de los ministros de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación en México

Abstract

In this report, the issue of the independence of the constitutional courts, such as the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation in Mexico, is addressed first, as well as the separation of powers, which are undeniably current, because through their decisions, the constitutional courts, give the final touches to the conformation of the constitutional State of law; without being able to separate the political aspect (division of powers) from the legal one (submission to the Constitution), which means that judicial independence is a hybrid figure.It continues with a comparative analysis of the systems for selecting judges from different countries, which have a political nature, which constitutes a fundamental aspect in the consideration of the independence of constitutional courts. Likewise, the study of the selection system of the ministers of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation in Mexico is addressed, which affects the political conformation of that court that, in theory, would have to be established as the balancer of the other powers; which is complemented by the analysis of the current conformation of the Mexican Court, under the management of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, and the ministers he has nominated..