Austeridad y marco institucional. ¿Afecta la inestabilidad política a la implementación de la devaluación interna?

  1. Bodea, Adrian
  2. Sánchez Santos, José Manuel
Revista:
International Review of Economic Policy: Revista Internacional de Política Económica

ISSN: 2695-7035

Año de publicación: 2019

Volumen: 1

Número: 1

Páginas: 1-20

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.7203/IREP.1.1.16455 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openAcceso abierto editor

Otras publicaciones en: International Review of Economic Policy: Revista Internacional de Política Económica

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Resumen

The objective of this study is to address the role played by political instability as a determinant of the implementation of internal devaluation policies. A look at the unit labor cost of the euro zone shows that there are some countries such as Ireland or Greece that were able to impose such measures (in terms of real unit labor costs) and others such as Italy or France that were left behind, an observation that brings the approach of the main hypothesis of our study: political instability affects the implementation of internal devaluation. Using panel data for the Eurozone countries and using a dynamic regression model, after controlling with the relevant economic and financial variables, the results obtained show that the expected survival time of the cabinets (calculated by survival analysis) has no significant effect on the evolution of the real unit labor cost. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study proved this type of relationship, even though is a very relevant and far-reaching topic of debate given the current social, political and economic context in Europe.

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