Mergin Firms' Strategies and the Merger Paradox

  1. José Méndez-Naya
Revista:
Nova Economia

ISSN: 0103-6351

Ano de publicación: 2018

Ano: 28

Número: 3

Páxinas: 1001-1015

Tipo: Artigo

DOI: 10.1590/0103-6351/4155 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR

Outras publicacións en: Nova Economia

Obxectivos de Desenvolvemento Sustentable

Resumo

Abstract Taking a model of horizontal mergers as a reference, the purpose of this paper is to qualify the merger paradox by proving that a multidivisional firm formed by a merger could be sustainable even though the merger does not involve most of the firms in the market. Specifically, it is proved that the minimum number of merging firms to have a profitable merger, assuming both simultaneous and sequential games, is lower in our model than in the traditional literature. Furthermore, it is proved that, if the multidivisional firm sets the number of divisions optimally, the merger is sustainable and less harmful to welfare than in the traditional model.

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Fonte de datos: Dialnet