International Organizations and the Theory of Clubs
ISSN: 1886-516X
Year of publication: 2010
Volume: 9
Pages: 17-27
Type: Article
More publications in: Revista de métodos cuantitativos para la economía y la empresa
Abstract
This paper focuses on international organizations, especially those regulating trade and exchange. It draws on the Theory of Clubs (Buchanan, 1965) and builds a model that aims to explain governments' optimal choices when joining international organizations. The results of the model show that governmental willingness to enlarge international organizations and to increase their degree of commitment are decreasing functions of both, the size of the organization, and the country's degree of commitment and of national heterogeneity.
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