Subsidios a la producción y delegación de la política comercial en una unión aduanera

  1. Méndez Naya, José
Revista:
Estudios de economía

ISSN: 0304-2758 0718-5286

Año de publicación: 2002

Volumen: 29

Número: 2

Páginas: 231-246

Tipo: Artículo

Otras publicaciones en: Estudios de economía

Resumen

By using a reciprocal dumping model, this paper justifies the existing preferential trade agreements as being a reaction to a third country export subsidy. On the other hand, assuming that one of the member countries may set its production subsidies optimally, the effects on welfare derived from the delegation of customs union`s commercial policy are addressed. The main result obtained is that in a non-transferable utility context the union is not sustainable.