Family Firm Succession

  1. Eduardo L. Giménez 1
  2. José Antonio Novo 2
  1. 1 Universidade de Vigo
    info

    Universidade de Vigo

    Vigo, España

    ROR https://ror.org/05rdf8595

  2. 2 Universidade da Coruña
    info

    Universidade da Coruña

    La Coruña, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01qckj285

Journal:
Documentos de Traballo. Análise Económica

ISSN: 1138-0713

Year of publication: 2015

Issue: 58

Pages: 1-61

Type: Working paper

DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Documentos de Traballo. Análise Económica

Abstract

We present a theory of family firm succession in which the incumbent regards a family member as a potential successor, as well as an outside candidate. Our setting considers that the incumbent can spend resources on training the family manager, as a key element in the intra-family transmission. The choice is explained in terms of quality of the candidates, monitoring costs, effectiveness of the training process and amenities. Our results account for observed findings, such as the partial retirement, the underperformance after succession, or the selection of a non-family manager only if he is markedly better than the family candidate.

Data source: Dialnet