Mergers in financial services and overlending

  1. David Peón 1
  2. Manel Antelo 2
  1. 1 Universidade da Coruña
    info

    Universidade da Coruña

    La Coruña, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01qckj285

  2. 2 Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
    info

    Universidade de Santiago de Compostela

    Santiago de Compostela, España

    ROR https://ror.org/030eybx10

Revista:
Cuadernos de economía: Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance

ISSN: 2340-6704,  0210-0266

Año de publicación: 2018

Volumen: 41

Número: 116

Páginas: 167-180

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.32826/CUDE.V42I116.80 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openBiblos-e Archivo editor

Otras publicaciones en: Cuadernos de economía: Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance

Resumen

Se propone un modelo de competencia bancaria que incluye un sesgo de exceso de confianza por parte de algunos gestores. Dos son los principales resultados que se derivan del modelo. Primero, una fusión entre bancos racionales puede cambiar su comportamiento de manera que, tras la fusión, seguirían al banco sesgado en condiciones en las que no lo habrían hecho antes de la fusión, ampliando el volumen de crédito concedido por el mercado bancario. Segundo, los resultados obtenidos resuelven la paradoja de las fusiones, en el sentido de que la fusión sería rentable para los participantes y, por tanto, intrínsecamente estable.

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Información de financiación

The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from the Xunta de Galicia (Spain) through Research Project ED431B2016/001 Consolidación e estruturación – 2016 GPC GI-2016 Análise económica dos mercados e institucións. This research has also received the funding of the Program for the “Consolidation and Structuring of Competitive Research Units - Research Networks (Redes de Investigación)” (Ref. ED341D R2016/014), Proxectos Plan Galego IDT, from the Xunta de Galicia (Spain).

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