Fiscal consolidation and the sustainability of public debt in the GIPSI countries

  1. Antelo, Manel
  2. Peón, David
Revista:
Cuadernos de economía: Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance

ISSN: 2340-6704,  0210-0266

Año de publicación: 2014

Volumen: 37

Número: 103

Páginas: 52-71

Tipo: Artículo

DOI: 10.1016/J.CESJEF.2013.10.002 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openBiblos-e Archivo editor

Otras publicaciones en: Cuadernos de economía: Spanish Journal of Economics and Finance

Objetivos de desarrollo sostenible

Resumen

Corregir los desajustes fiscales y reducir la deuda pública son dos objetivos prioritarios para los países periféricos de la Eurozona, si bien no existe consenso sobre la política más adecuada para alcanzarlos. En este artículo repasamos los efectos que las diferentes políticas de consolidación fiscal tienen sobre los agregados macroeconómicos y ofrecemos un análisis empírico que complementa el reciente estudio del FMI sobre la sostenibilidad de la deuda pública en los citados países en diferentes escenarios de crecimiento, inflación, y políticas fiscales y monetarias. Asimismo, describimos la política que consideramos más deseable para los países de la periferia de la Eurozona al objeto de alcanzar la consolidación fiscal y el crecimiento económico.

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Información de financiación

Insightful comments and suggestions by A. Costas, F. del Río and D. García‐Coto are gratefully acknowledged. M.A. also acknowledges financial aid received from the Galician Regional Government (Xunta de Galicia) through Grant GPC 2013‐045.

Financiadores

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