Three kinds of self-respect in Rawls

  1. Crego, Jorge 1
  1. 1 Universidade da Coruña
    info

    Universidade da Coruña

    La Coruña, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01qckj285

Journal:
Ethics, Politics & Society

ISSN: 2184-2582,  2184-2574

Year of publication: 2022

Volume: 5

Issue: 2

Pages: 109-126

Type: Article

DOI: 10.21814/EPS.5.2.207 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Ethics, Politics & Society

Sustainable development goals

Abstract

Rawls’s remarks on self-respect have been described as cryptic or ambiguous. The discussion on the meaning of respect and, specifically, Rawlsian self-respect has been considerably influenced by Darwall’s distinction between recognition respect and appraisal respect. This paper defends that Darwall’s dichotomic misses an important dimension of Rawlsian self-respect which can be termed “value-confidence”. This third kind of self-respect concerns one’s confidence in the value of the particular conception of the good one has chosen. Value-confidence differs from recognition self-respect, even if both dimensions are intimately connected. The distinction between recognition self-respect and value-confidence resembles the dual nature of moral personality in Rawls and the different roles of basic institutions and communities of interests.

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