La singularidad jurídica y el retorno del filósofo-reypotenciales consecuencias para el imperio de la ley y la democracia

  1. Jorge Crego 1
  1. 1 Universidade da Coruña
    info

    Universidade da Coruña

    La Coruña, España

    ROR https://ror.org/01qckj285

Journal:
Persona y derecho: Revista de fundamentación de las Instituciones Jurídicas y de Derechos Humanos

ISSN: 0211-4526

Year of publication: 2021

Issue: 85

Type: Article

DOI: 10.15581/011.85.008 DIALNET GOOGLE SCHOLAR lock_openOpen access editor

More publications in: Persona y derecho: Revista de fundamentación de las Instituciones Jurídicas y de Derechos Humanos

Sustainable development goals

Abstract

Implementing machine learning in law would transform current legal orders, based on the rule of law. The result would be ≪legal singularity≫: an order based on ≪precisely tailored laws, specifying the exact behavior that is permitted in every situation≫. According to its proponents, this would promote justice and legal certainty. Through a comparison with the Platonic proposal of the philosopher-king, this article defends that, even if the aforementioned values were to be promoted, the inherent opacity of machine learning systems would hamper the public scrutiny of the resulting normative order, affecting its legitimacy. Thus, current political communities must deliberate about the benefits and drawbacks of legal singularity and must reflect on the use of artificial intelligence in law.

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