El interés de orden superior en la disponibilidad de la propia vida y la prioridad de la libertad. Una evaluación del equilibrio reflexivo de la justice as fairness de Rawls

  1. Jorge Crego 1
  1. 1 Universidade da Coruña (España)
Journal:
Revista telemática de filosofía del derecho ( RTFD )

ISSN: 1575-7382

Year of publication: 2018

Issue: 21

Pages: 135-164

Type: Article

More publications in: Revista telemática de filosofía del derecho ( RTFD )

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to evaluate the reflective equilibrium between the acknowledgment of the right to end one’s life and the Rawlsian idea of freedom. This article evaluates the possibility of a self-destructive exercise of freedom. It is asserted that this kind of exercise is inconsistent with the highest order interest in freedom. Allowing the self-destructive practice of freedom jeopardizes the Rawlsian foundation of the priority of liberty, a crucial aspect of the justice as fairness